As promised this post will attempt to explain how radicalism on campuses and amongst university faculties can, and indeed should be curtailed in order to protect Free Speech. This is a difficult topic, and I ask readers to bear with me as I attempt to articulate my case. In some cases I may not elaborate on a particular point for the sake of brevity, and ask that questions be freely asked if clarification (or further explanation) is desired. As always your comments and input are most welcome.
Note: I am sorry to have to explain this, but to avoid confusion please note that the term 'liberal' is not used to denote political leaning to the left, but rather in the sense that one is in favor of liberty and a free society.
Free Speech:
Freedom of speech is amongst the most cherished of American values, and rightly so. It is this freedom that leads to the free flow of ideas, to political change, to social adaptation and growth, to a free and liberal society. That being said, there are certain understood limitations that we, as a respoinsible society, recognize as needed to protect ourselves from the consequences of certain types of speech.
Limitations:
In early U.S. Supreme Court rulings (understood loosely to mean rulings from the 19th century) the limit of free speech became understood as 'yelling "fire!" in a crowded theater.' That is, speech that leads directly to the harm of others (an individual or a group) can be restricted in order to maintain peace and order. Therefore one limit on the freedom of speech curtails statements that directly lead to the harm of others. A common way of understanding this would be to say that my right to speak (and by extension, to express myself) ends at the tip of your nose.
But there are other cases where speech may be justifiably limited, namely situations in which one's speech comes into conflict with that of another.
Concepts - Speech Acts:
According to the Philosopher J.L. Austin, when we speak, we do more than merely make sounds, we act. Some examples of speech acts, understood as speech that accomplishes something, are:
- “I do.” (in a marriage ceremony)
- “I name this ship the SS More powerful that Batman, Superman, and the Incredible Hulk put together.”
- “I give and bequeath my house to my son.” (in a will)
- “I bet you a dollar in will snow tomorrow.”
For the sake of brevity I will leave the examples above to speak for themselves. Such speech acts can be distributed into three categories:
- locutionary acts: what is said.
- perlocutionary acts: the effects of what is said.
- illocutionary acts: the action that the saying constitutes.
That is:
- locutionary acts: the actual utterance, "I do"
- perlocutionary acts: the result of the utterance, if one says "I do" one becomes married
- illocutionary acts: the action that the saying constitutes, saying "I do" constitutes entering into the bonds of marriage. More simply, the illocutionary act of saying "I do" is that the couple is married.
Another important concept to understand here (and I promise that this will all become relevant by the end of this post) is that of felicity conditions, of which there are three:
- speaker's intention
- uptake,
- and (social) conventions
In order for a speech act to be successful, the felicity conditions must be fulfilled.
The last concept that needs to be explained is that of silencing. There are cases in which certain speech can, in effect, silence others. Namely:
- locutionary silencing: physical silencing, for example if a judge says “Silence in the courtroom!”
- perlocutionary frustration: a sort of neutralization of the intended effects of a speech act
- illocutionary disablement: for example, an actor yells 'fire!' to indicate to the audience that there is, in fact, a fire, but the audience believes this to be a part of the show, and so does not respond to the actor's alarm
Some speech acts can result in illocutionary disablement by fixing or determining the felicity conditions of some set of speech acts, thus rendering the illocutionary act of a speaker disabled. One classic example of this is that of a South African legislator’s utterances that determine who may and who may not vote, and thus disables a black South African’s illocutionary act of voting.
Arguments:
The issue of free speech as it relates to radical professors such as Joseph Massad and the like rests on understanding Freedom of Speech as being defined as the protection of speech acts. That is, if one defines free speech in terms of the speech acts one performs by talking or sharing an opinion, radical professors actually infringe on the free speech of their students when espousing their paranoid, hate-filled ideas.
In the case of a radical professor, such as Joseph Massad, his rantings and ravings (see the New York Sun article mentioned in a previous post) have the effect of disabling the illocutionary acts of his students.
In other words, because Mr. Massad is speaking from the position of a Professor, which in a university carries the weight and influence of academic authority, he is able to literally define the lexicon of the discussion. That is, he, and those like him, define the type of rhetoric that is used in academic discussions of the Israeli-Palestinaian conflict. Normally this would not be a problem, but given the publicly recognized radicalism of Mr. Massad (who is being used as a case study for what is, sadly, a larger trend in the American academy), this speech prevents his students from being able to exercise their free speech.
For example, when Mr. Massad states that "Zionists have adopted the identity of the anti-Semite and Palestinians have taken on a Jewish identity" he is making it impossible for a pro-Israeli student to make the claim that they are a zionist (A zionist is, contrary to the radical ideas of people like Massad, not a racist, bigoted and violent person, but rather a zionist is a believer in, and supporter of the State of Israel as a Jewish State. I would hesitate to use the phrase 'Jewish Nationalism', but zionsim certainly approaches this in some ways), as this would result in them being understood not as they intended (as a supporter of the Jewish State), but as Mr. Massad has most unfairly defined (a bigot).
The result, in this instance, is the illocutionary disablement of the student's speech act of support for Israel by disrupting the felicity conditions of the student's speech act. That is, because Mr. Massad and other radical professor's like him have, in effect, redefined (at least in the context of their classrooms) the rehtoric, it is impossible for a student to state 'I am a zionist' without being misunderstood. the student's illocutionary act of supporting Israel becomes an act of declaring one's supposed prejudices. to use terms included in the conceptual discussion above, neither the speaker's intent nor the audience's uptake are satisfied, and so the speech act of the pro-Israel student is nullified. To put it one last way, the radical professor's are setting the felicity conditions of the student's speech, and so it is impossible for the student to speak freely.
'Why,' one might ask, 'should the speech of the professor be limited to protect the ability of one or a few students to declare their support for Israel?'
In response I would argue that, because these professors are in a position of educating students, they are in a position to define the rhetoric that will ultimately be used in a much broader sense. Consider a high school instituting mandatory profanity usage policies whereby students may only refer to their parents as assholes. While many teenagers may sometimes feel this way, to teach this in a school would legitimize an obviously ridiculous concept, and formalize the disrespect of parents in society. The same logic applies to university faculty (and indeed educators at all levels). If faculty like Joseph Massad are allowed to continue to pass along their hate-filled, biased, and radical ideas and sentiments as authentic scholarship, then society will be forced, without knowing it, into thinking along the lines of men like Joseph Massad (radical islamists). The end result of this would not be the silencing of a few students who disagree, or of a few students who identify as pro-Israel, rather the result would be a dangerous shut-down on pro-Israel and non-anti-Semitic perspectives, effectively silencing a much larger segment of society.
In light of this, I believe that the protection of academic freedom and freedom of speech can and should be lifted from men and women like Massad, as the consequences are far worse than the restriction on the free speech of a few. I do not contend that opinions such as theirs ought never be heard, but rather that they ought not be condoned as academic work and scholarship.
New: An excellent article was recently written on this subject here.